The second week brought the growing hurricane awareness. The National Hurricane Center advisories would have been part of their daily routine from at least October 7 or 8, as Raymond began to organize and intensify. The evasion decisions — the three days of trying to get clear of the projected track — consumed the days from approximately October 9 to 12.
By October 12, they were in deteriorating conditions. The seas would have been building for at least 24 hours before the worst of the storm arrived; the Hazana would have been hove-to or running off under reduced canvas, trying to manage the conditions while still seeking a path clear of the storm’s center. The specific sequence of events on October 12 — when the barometer dropped below 28 inches, when the anemometer maxed out at 140 knots, when the pitchpoling event occurred — represents the terminal phase of a 72-hour deterioration.
Sharp tethered himself and sent Tami below. This decision — the allocation of positions on the vessel at the moment of maximum danger — reflects the kind of thinking that experienced sailors do in survival situations: the person below has better protection from the sea; the person on deck can respond to immediate sailing emergencies. The tether was intended to keep Sharp attached to the vessel if he went overboard; it failed when the D-ring pried apart during the capsize.
The specific mechanics of how a D-ring on a tether fails are not mysterious: a D-ring is designed to hold a load within its rated capacity, and the forces generated by a pitchpoling 44-foot yacht are extreme. The rating of the specific D-ring on Sharp’s tether is not documented. What is documented is the outcome: when Ashcraft regained consciousness 27 hours later, Sharp was gone, and the tether was dangling from the safety line.