The road running through Murphy’s position was also significant. The HistoryNet account describes it as a narrow dirt road running from Holtzwihr through the forest toward regimental headquarters to the north. This was the road the German advance was aimed at. If the German armor reached the road and followed it north, it would arrive at higher-level American positions that were not prepared to receive a tank attack from the south.
Murphy’s position, in the most practical terms, was blocking the road. The drainage ditch that served as his command post was parallel to the road. The two M10s had straddled the road. The German objective was to push through his position and follow that road north. His objective was to prevent that from happening until the reinforcement that was supposed to come — the 2nd Battalion, 30th Infantry, which never arrived — could arrive.
## The Artillery Coordination in Detail
The artillery that Murphy directed throughout the January 26 action was not a simple call and response. It was an extended, evolving coordination under fire, with communication problems and changing conditions, that required sustained concentration while simultaneously under direct attack.
The specific arrangement involved the field telephone connecting Murphy’s command post to 1st Battalion headquarters approximately one mile to the rear. Forward observer First Lieutenant Walter Weispfenning had radio equipment, but the HistoryNet account notes radio problems with his equipment that limited his ability to call fire directly. Murphy was therefore the primary relay — taking information about the German advance from his own observation, calling targets to battalion headquarters, which then passed the fire requests on to the artillery batteries.