The timing of German responses once the invasion began was also affected. When the Allied assault actually landed on July 10, 1943, there was an initial period of uncertainty in German command about whether this was the main attack or a secondary operation designed to draw attention from Greece or Sardinia. This uncertainty delayed the deployment of reserves and contributed to the Allied forces establishing themselves ashore before facing maximum resistance.
The Hermann Goering Division, which was one of the stronger German formations in Sicily, was initially held back because of uncertainty about whether the landing was the real thing. This hesitation, which was partly a product of the Mincemeat-induced uncertainty about Allied intentions, had operational consequences for the opening phase of the battle.
K. SICILY AND THE FULL ACCOUNTING OF OPERATION MINCEMEAT’S CONTRIBUTION
Operation Husky, the Allied invasion of Sicily, began on the night of July 9-10, 1943, with an airborne assault followed by the largest amphibious operation in history to that point.
The landings were not without difficulties. The airborne operations were badly disrupted by poor weather and navigational errors, with paratroopers and glider troops scattered over a wide area, some landing in the sea and some far from their objectives. The losses in the airborne phase were significant. The amphibious phase went better, with the Eighth Army under Montgomery landing in the southeast and the Seventh Army under Patton landing in the south and southwest.
The initial German and Italian response was less concentrated than it might have been. The uncertainties about Allied intentions, which the Mincemeat operation had contributed to creating, meant that German command was slow to commit reserves. Kesselring’s headquarters was not immediately certain that this was the main Allied effort and not a feint.