The specific locations where the 23rd deployed its deception — around Dulken and Dyck/Dornbusch, with an additional lake area used for the simulated bridge activity — were chosen to suggest that the main crossing preparation was occurring in the XIII Corps zone. The actual XVI Corps crossing would take place approximately ten miles away. For the deception to work, the German forces in and around the XIII Corps zone had to be convinced not merely that the deception showed something interesting, but that the XIII Corps zone was where the main American crossing effort would materialize.
The terrain choices reflected understanding of how German intelligence would read the picture. Artillery positions, bridge-approach areas, unit assembly zones — all of these had specific terrain signatures that a photographic analyst would look for. The 23rd placed its visual deception in terrain that made sense for the operations it was supposedly suggesting: the approach areas for a river crossing in the XIII Corps sector looked like approach areas for a river crossing should look.
The 27 artillery battalions — real and simulated — in the XIII Corps zone mentioned in the operation’s records suggest the scale of the combined picture the XIII Corps was projecting. The 23rd’s deception was embedded within a larger military effort to present a convincing offensive preparation in this sector, with real fires and logistics activity supplementing the fake unit presence.
## What 1,100 Men Could Pretend to Be
The 23rd Headquarters Special Troops, at approximately 1,100 men, could simulate a force 30 to 40 times its actual size. At Operation Viersen this meant pretending to be two infantry divisions totaling between 30,000 and 40,000 troops.