The two German panzer-type divisions that remained in reserve positions opposite the XIII Corps zone during the actual XVI Corps crossing represent the clearest evidence of operational effect. Reserve armor is the resource a commander withholds to respond to unexpected developments and to exploit breakthroughs. Panzer divisions in reserve can be moved relatively quickly to reinforce a threatened sector or to counterattack across a contested crossing. German commanders who had reason to believe the main Allied effort was coming in the XIII Corps zone had reason to keep their armored reserves positioned to respond there.
The timing matters. The XVI Corps crossing began on March 24, 1945. If German commanders had realized before that date that the XIII Corps activity was deception, they might have moved their armored reserves. They did not. The subsequent inability to effectively counterattack the XVI Corps bridgehead was influenced, among other factors, by the positioning of forces that the deception had contributed to.
This chain of inference is exactly what military historians and practitioners mean by saying that deception created exploitable uncertainty. It did not eliminate German combat power. It did not guarantee Allied success. It contributed to the conditions — German reserves in the wrong position, German commanders uncertain about where the main effort was coming — that made the actual crossing less costly than it might otherwise have been.
## The Art of Making Nothing Look Like Something
The fundamental technical challenge of visual deception is that it requires making nothing — empty ground, empty air, an absence of real equipment — look like the organized presence of a military formation.