Roy Harley and several others made the journey to the tail section in mid-November. They found what they had hoped: the tail contained luggage (more warm clothing), some additional food supplies, and the aircraft’s large batteries. They also found, in the tail section’s electronics, the remains of the aircraft’s radio equipment.
Harley had some knowledge of electronics. The idea was that the batteries from the tail section might power the aircraft’s radio, which had been receiving broadcasts from the cockpit throughout the ordeal. If they could power the radio for transmission, not just reception, they might be able to broadcast a distress signal.
The attempt failed. The aircraft’s avionics required 115 volts of alternating current. The batteries produced 24 volts of direct current. The two systems were incompatible. Despite Harley’s efforts over several days to find a configuration that might work, no radio contact was possible.
The failure of the radio attempt was another psychological turning point. The survivors had maintained, through the weeks of waiting and the aftermath of the avalanche, a residual hope that rescue might arrive from outside. The radio had been a potential tool for making that happen. Its failure confirmed what the cancellation of the official search had already indicated: there was no passive rescue scenario available. If they were going to survive, the survivors were going to have to do it themselves.
They began planning the final expedition in earnest.
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## The Sleeping Bag and the Expedition Plan
One of the most significant practical achievements of the survivors during November was the construction of a sleeping bag capable of withstanding Andean winter temperatures.