This was the specific commercial cost of doing the rescue openly — of going to the tunnel himself, as himself, and doing what needed to be done in public. The alternative — remaining anonymous, sending the hoods without attaching his name and presence to their use — might have protected his commercial interests. It is not documented that he considered this calculation at the time, and the accounts of his arrival at the tunnel suggest he acted with urgency rather than deliberation about commercial consequences.
What is documented is the result: orders canceled because of his race, the same race that had been successfully concealed before the disaster became public.
The disguise system could not be restored once his identity was known. Rebuilding the sales operation under a concealed identity was no longer possible. The rescue that proved the hood’s value had also identified its inventor in a way that allowed discrimination to operate at scale.
The military outcome was different. The Army purchased large quantities of the hood — or devices closely modeled on it — for use in World War I. The specific relationship between Morgan’s design and the Army’s procurement is complicated; the Army developed its own gas mask designs and worked with multiple suppliers, and the question of how directly the Morgan hood influenced military equipment is not resolved in the accessible sources. What is documented is that the Army bought similar equipment in quantity during the war, and that the principle Morgan had demonstrated — providing fresh air to workers in contaminated environments — was applied in multiple military and industrial contexts.
