The specific official who sent the messenger is not consistently identified in the accessible sources. What is consistent is that the connection between the disaster and Morgan was made through someone who was aware of his device and understood that conventional rescue without breathing protection had already failed. By July 1916, the safety hood had been on the market for two years, had won awards at safety expositions, and had been sold to fire departments. Its existence was not secret among safety-minded officials.

 

Morgan arrived at the lakefront in the early hours of July 25 with his brother Frank and approximately twenty hoods. The accounts differ on exactly how many people came with him — some describe Frank and two volunteers, others mention additional individuals. What is consistent is that Morgan and Frank were the principal actors in what followed.

 

The scene at the tunnel entrance was complicated by the presence of officials and workers who were skeptical of the device and of Morgan himself. Multiple sources note that the men present were reluctant to accept help from someone they did not know, with equipment they had not seen used. The failed rescue attempts had not come from lack of will; they had come from lack of protection. It was not obvious, to people watching in the early morning hours of a disaster, that this device would succeed where previous attempts had failed.

 

Morgan and Frank suited up and went in.

 

—

 

## Down Into the Tunnel

 

The descent into the tunnel required moving down a shaft to the tunnel level and then advancing along the tunnel floor toward the face. The distance from the shaft entrance to the tunnel face was substantial — the accounts give roughly four miles from the lakefront as the total tunnel length, though the exact distance the rescue party had to travel varied depending on how far the gas extended back toward the shaft.

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