The fundamental cause was the difficulty of coordinating artillery with infantry in terrain where communication was unreliable. Artillery commanders needed to know exactly where their own troops were in order to direct fire. If that information was wrong — because positions had changed, because the infantry had advanced further than reported, because coordinates had been misread — the guns would fire on the wrong target. The fog of war was not a metaphor but a literal condition in the Argonne Forest.
The October 4 barrage that struck Whittlesey’s position was not necessarily the result of negligence or error by any individual. The battalion had moved further north than the flanking units, which meant that the standard artillery support patterns may have placed them in front of their own guns. The coordinates that the artillery was using may have been correct for the battalion’s intended position but wrong for where they had actually ended up. Or the coordinates may have been misread or miscommunicated somewhere in the chain of command.
Whatever the specific cause, the result was American shells landing on American soldiers who were already under German attack. The men in the pocket could see the American artillery shells — could distinguish them, at least in some cases, from German fire by their trajectory or by the direction from which they came. The experience of being shelled by one’s own side, in addition to being under German fire, was both physically dangerous and psychologically disorienting.
The solution required getting accurate position information to the artillery. That was what Whittlesey’s October 4 message was attempting to accomplish. Whether it accomplished it, or whether the shelling stopped for other reasons, is the question that the documented record does not definitively answer.
