Whittlesey’s battalion had advanced into the Argonne, and by the time it was surrounded, any wire connection to the rear had been cut or was not established. The telephone was not an option.

 

Radio existed in 1918, but tactical radio was not yet reliable or widely distributed at the battalion level. Sets were heavy, their range was limited, and the technical expertise required to operate them was not universally available in frontline units. The American army in 1918 did not have the kind of portable tactical radio communications that would become standard in the Second World War.

 

Human runners — soldiers assigned to carry messages between units — were the most direct alternative to wire communications. Whittlesey sent runners. Several were killed. The survivors of the encirclement included soldiers who had attempted to carry messages and failed to get through. The human cost of runner communications under heavy fire was substantial, and the success rate was unreliable.

 

Carrier pigeons operated in a different channel. They did not need to navigate through enemy lines on foot. They flew. A German soldier could shoot at a pigeon, as they shot at Cher Ami, but a pigeon presented a much smaller and faster target than a human runner. The probability of a pigeon getting through was higher than the probability of a runner getting through, in the specific conditions of the Argonne on October 4.

 

This is the genuine significance of the pigeon service and of Cher Ami’s flight. Not that the pigeon single-handedly saved the battalion, or that the message directly stopped the shelling — the evidence for those claims is contested. But that in a situation where other communications had failed, a carrier pigeon could still get a message through. That is what it was designed to do. That is what it did.

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