The halt lasted until May 26, two days. These two days gave Allied forces time to strengthen the defensive perimeter around Dunkirk and to begin organizing the evacuation. Without them, German armor might have reached the Dunkirk perimeter before the naval operation could get organized. The British and French rearguard forces that held the perimeter open throughout the nine days of the evacuation bought the time that the halt order initiated.
Hermann Goering’s Luftwaffe was given primary responsibility for destroying the Allied forces during the halt period, with the promise that air power could accomplish what tanks were being rested from attempting. This decision contributed to what happened next: German air attacks on the beaches and ships were severe and costly, but they did not succeed in breaking the evacuation. The Luftwaffe’s effectiveness was reduced by several factors, including cloud cover on some days, the range limitations of some German aircraft over the Channel, and the defensive actions of the Royal Air Force.
The halt order’s causes and consequences have been debated by historians since the war ended. Some historians have emphasized von Rundstedt’s operational concerns about his tanks’ condition; others have focused on Hitler’s own role in approving and prolonging the halt. The question of whether the halt was a catastrophic strategic blunder or a defensible operational decision remains genuinely contested. What is established is that it happened, that it gave the Allied forces a window, and that the evacuation succeeded in part because that window existed.
## The Perimeter Defense
