The panzers crossed the Meuse at Sedan on May 13, three days after the offensive began. The speed of the crossing, and the collapse of the French units holding the Sedan sector, created a gap in the Allied line that the reserves could not close quickly enough. Within a week, German armored columns were driving toward the Channel coast. By May 20, the leading German units had reached the sea at Abbeville, and the Allied forces in Belgium — including the BEF — were encircled.
General Lord Gort’s decision to begin preparing for evacuation came from his assessment that the encirclement could not be broken and that the BEF’s survival depended on extraction by sea. This was not a decision made lightly or without controversy; the French high command wanted Gort to participate in a combined Allied counterattack to cut through the German armored corridor and restore a continuous front. Gort judged, correctly as it turned out, that this was not feasible with the forces available. His decision to prioritize evacuation over the counterattack was one of the pivotal decisions of the campaign, and it was the decision that made Dunkirk possible.
The implications of France’s collapse extended well beyond Dunkirk itself. The French Army was the largest on the Allied side and was considered, by most military analysts of the period, to be one of the strongest in the world. Its defeat in six weeks shattered the strategic framework on which British planning had been based. The assumption of a long war in which Allied resources would gradually overcome German advantages, as in the First World War, was no longer valid. Britain faced the possibility of facing Germany without a continental ally, across a Channel that had ceased to be a simple strategic barrier.
