Ramsay switched ships between routes based on the current threat assessment, air attack patterns, and mine-laying activity. This constant adjustment was itself a form of management that required continuous intelligence about conditions on each route and rapid communication with vessels at sea. The signals traffic between Dover and the ships at sea throughout the operation was enormous, and the ability to maintain it — to keep track of where vessels were, what routes they were taking, and what conditions they were reporting — was part of what made the organized chaos of Dynamo function.
The route management also had implications for the small boats. Many civilian craft were not equipped for or capable of navigating the longer routes under the conditions prevailing in late May and early June. The 39-mile Route Z was the route most of the small boats used, and the risks of that route — coastal artillery, submarine threat, air attack — were the risks they accepted along with it.
## Loading Under Fire: The Experience of the Ships
The ships that made repeated crossings to Dunkirk between May 26 and June 4 were doing something that naval doctrine did not specifically address: conducting mass embarkation under continuous air attack, in a harbor with damaged infrastructure, with untrained troops who had not been prepared for the experience of boarding naval vessels at speed.
Destroyers making multiple crossings accumulated damage over the course of the operation. A destroyer that had been near-missed by bombs, that had taken shrapnel hits, that had its crew reduced by casualties from earlier crossings, was still expected to return to Dunkirk and load more troops. The rate of ship losses reflects the cumulative nature of this exposure: 236 vessels of all types were lost over nine days.
