The artillery loss was particularly significant. The British field artillery regiments that evacuated with the BEF came back without their guns. The anti-tank guns that the Army needed to defend against armored attack were left behind. The heavy artillery that would have been used in any defensive battle against a German landing was gone. Britain in June 1940 had, in terms of heavy weapons, an army with its manpower but without much of its killing power.
The vehicle loss affected the Army’s operational mobility. An army that cannot move its logistics, its headquarters, and its support elements quickly is an army whose effectiveness in mobile operations is compromised. The trucks and specialized vehicles left in France had to be replaced before the BEF could function again as a fully mobile force.
The replacement of this equipment required industrial production that took time. The United States was not yet in the war and was operating under its own political constraints on arms sales to belligerents; some material was supplied through Lend-Lease arrangements that were not in place until 1941. Britain’s rearmament program was producing new equipment, but the demand created by Dunkirk’s losses placed extraordinary pressure on the production system.
The strategic implication was that Britain’s ability to respond militarily to a German invasion in the summer of 1940 was significantly more limited than it would have been if the equipment had been saved. The plan for home defense depended primarily on the Royal Navy’s ability to disrupt an invasion fleet before it could land, the RAF’s ability to establish air superiority, and a ground defense that was operating with severely reduced heavy weapons.
