In the context of Operation Viersen, the 406th was responsible for security during the most exposed phase of the operation — the period when the 23rd was forward in its positions, claiming to represent two infantry divisions, while the real army was massing ten miles away for the actual crossing. If German patrols had penetrated to the deception positions in force, the 406th would have been the first and likely only line of defense for a unit that was not configured or intended for heavy combat.
## What German Intelligence Saw
The post-war exploitation of German military records has provided some documentary evidence of what the Viersen deception looked like from the other side.
German intelligence in the last months of the war was operating under severe constraints. The Luftwaffe, which had been the primary vehicle for photographic reconnaissance, was depleted and had increasingly limited ability to conduct systematic reconnaissance of the entire front. Ground intelligence — patrols, prisoner interrogations, intercepted communications — was more reliable but slower and had less reach. The combined picture of what the American Ninth Army was doing before the Rhine crossing in March 1945 was assembled from fragmentary evidence and interpreted under conditions of institutional stress.
What is documented is that in the XIII Corps zone — where the 23rd’s deception was focused — German forces were expecting a major attack. The 30th Division’s G-2 (intelligence officer) reported that no prisoners from units in that sector had expected an attack from the west. The implication is that German defenders in that zone were oriented toward the deception, not toward the actual crossing point.