The art market in the 1930s and 1940s — and to a significant extent the art market in subsequent decades — depended on a relatively small number of authoritative figures whose pronouncements about attribution carried decisive weight. This concentration of authority was, in one sense, a strength: it allowed the market to function without requiring every buyer to independently assess every work. But it was also a vulnerability, because it created a small number of targets whose manipulation could yield large returns.

Van Meegeren targeted Bredius specifically because Bredius’s authentication would carry through the market in a way that any other authentication would not. Getting Bredius to authenticate the Emmaus was not simply a matter of fooling one expert. It was a matter of injecting a fraudulent attribution into the top of the authority hierarchy, from which it would cascade downward through the entire institutional structure. Once Bredius had spoken, every subsequent expert would be evaluating the painting against the established fact of Bredius’s authentication, not against the painting itself.

This cascade effect is visible in the subsequent forgery sales. The buyers who acquired the later van Meegeren forgeries were not all relying primarily on their own independent assessments. They were relying on the fact that works from the same provenance network had already been authenticated and acquired by credible institutions. The Emmaus at the Boijmans provided cover for every subsequent forgery in the same network — not because any explicit connection was drawn, but because the existence of an authenticated and institutionally held work from the same provenance line made subsequent works from the same line more plausible.

ADVERTISEMENT
Advertisement
Share.