The fund’s standard of heroism required that the act involve extraordinary personal risk. This standard was designed to distinguish genuine heroism from ordinary bravery or professional duty: a firefighter fighting a fire was doing their job; a civilian who ran into a burning building to save someone was doing something beyond ordinary duty.
The fund’s reasoning for not awarding Morgan — that his hood reduced his risk below the “extraordinary” threshold — has a logic that can be stated: someone with a protective device is taking less risk than someone without one, and the standard of heroism is defined in terms of personal risk taken. If the risk is reduced by the device, the heroism is reduced accordingly.
This reasoning fails on application for the specific reason that the previous, unprotected rescue parties had already established that the tunnel’s gas was acutely lethal. Morgan’s hood did not make the descent safe; it made it survivable, with significant margin for error. If the hood failed, or if the air supply ran out, or if any of the mechanical components failed in the tunnel environment, the outcome would have been the same as for the previous parties. The fifteen-minute air supply in the airbag was not a generous margin for a rescue that required navigating to the face, finding survivors, and hauling them back through gas-filled darkness.
Whether extraordinary risk existed in this scenario is a judgment call. The Carnegie Fund’s judgment was that it did not. The judgment appears to have been applied selectively: the other rescuers who used Morgan’s hoods also had their risk reduced by those hoods. If the hood’s risk-reduction effect disqualified Morgan, it should have disqualified anyone who used the hood. The selectivity suggests that factors beyond the stated criteria may have been operating.
