At the surface, the initial response was the standard response to mine disasters: organize rescue teams, go in, bring people out. The first rescue party was led by John Johnston, the foreman or supervisor on the job. The party entered the tunnel. When sufficient time had passed without their return, it became clear they had not made it back. A second party was organized, led by a man named Gus Van Duzen. That party also entered the tunnel. It also did not come back.
By the early hours of July 25, the situation had become what it always becomes in multiple-party tunnel disasters: each failed rescue attempt has added to the casualty count rather than reduced it. The gas that had killed the original workers had now also killed or incapacitated multiple rescuers. The practical problem facing the authorities on the surface was that sending more men without protection was sending more men to die.
The specific death toll in the initial explosion and the failed rescue attempts varies across sources, which is consistent with the chaos of the disaster’s first hours. Some sources give eleven dead among the original workers; others give nine. The count of rescuers who died or were incapacitated also varies. The Scientific American account cites eleven of eighteen rescuers dying in the failed attempts; the Substack account gives ten would-be rescuers dead. These numbers were still being established while events were ongoing.
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## The Messenger in the Night
Garrett Morgan was not at the tunnel. He was home, asleep, when the messenger arrived. The accounts vary on the precise time — some say early morning on July 25, others simply say “in the night” — but the basic circumstance is documented: a police captain or official who knew of Morgan’s safety hood sent someone to bring him.
