The 77th Division was assigned to attack through the western portion of the Argonne, clearing the forest and advancing north. Its neighbors to the right were American units advancing along the Meuse valley; its neighbors to the left, in this sector, were French forces. The coordination between American and French units would become a critical element of the Lost Battalion’s situation, since the battalion’s isolation resulted partly from the French failing to maintain pace with the American advance.
The 77th Division’s composition made it, in some ways, an unusual unit for a difficult forest assault. It was a National Army division — organized around draftees rather than regular Army volunteers — and many of its men had been in uniform for only a year or less. Replacements had arrived from across the country, and some accounts note that men from Midwestern farms with little urban experience or formal education had been integrated into what had originally been a New York-heavy unit. The division had trained, fought in earlier sectors, and developed the kind of unit cohesion that combat experience builds, but it was not the most experienced American division in France by October 1918.
Whittlesey was aware of the challenges. His orders on October 2 required him to advance north regardless of what happened on his flanks. If neighboring units failed to keep up, the orders contemplated that he should continue his mission and that flanking units would catch up. This was standard aggressive-offensive doctrine. It was also the doctrine that created the conditions for the battalion’s isolation.
