This rear fuselage stretch — the distance between the mid-upper gunner’s position and the rear turret — was approximately 25 feet of unheated, unlit, vibrating fuselage. The parachute rack for the rear gunner was positioned at the rear fuselage door, which was the logical place for it: the gunner would exit the turret, step back into the fuselage, clip on the parachute, and exit through the door or through the opened turret. The distance from the turret to the rack was not great under normal circumstances. Under the circumstances of a burning Lancaster in a tightening spiral, it was the distance that determined Alkemade’s fate.

The Lancaster’s vulnerability to fire was a characteristic well known to its crews and to the German night fighter arm. The wing fuel tanks — four main tanks per side, with total fuel capacity of over 2,000 gallons — were the primary target of the upward-firing Schräge Musik attacks used by night fighters like Rökker. A burst of cannon fire into a wing fuel tank could ignite the fuel in the tank, the vapor above it, and the hydraulic fluid in the adjacent lines, producing a fire that spread rapidly through the wing structure and into the fuselage.

The fire suppression systems available on the Lancaster were limited by the technology of 1944. Engine fire extinguishers could suppress fires in the engine nacelles but had no effect on wing or fuselage fires fed by ruptured fuel lines. The crew’s options when a serious fire developed were limited to attempting to control it manually, diving the aircraft to try to blow out the flames, or bailing out. With a fire that had spread quickly and comprehensively, as the accounts indicate happened to DS664, the bail-out order would have come immediately.

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