Bomber Command flew its first operational sorties of the Second World War on the night of September 3/4, 1939, and its last major operations in April 1945. Over those five and a half years it dispatched approximately 390,000 operational sorties, dropped approximately 1,000,000 tons of bombs, and lost approximately 8,325 aircraft over enemy territory. Approximately 55,573 aircrew were killed — roughly the same population as a medium-sized city, lost in slightly under six years of operations. Another approximately 8,403 were wounded and approximately 9,838 were taken prisoner.
These numbers are presented not to make a judgment about the strategic bombing campaign or its moral character — that debate has been conducted extensively elsewhere and admits of no easy resolution — but to provide the specific scale within which the events of March 24/25, 1944, occurred. The 72 aircraft lost that night represented roughly 504 aircrew killed or captured, the overwhelming majority of whom were killed. Each of those aircraft carried a crew trained over months, an aircraft produced over weeks, an accumulated investment of industrial and human capital that could not be replaced quickly. And the losses came nightly, throughout the campaign, until the war ended.
The specific loss rate that was considered “acceptable” by Bomber Command leadership — a phrase that carries obvious moral weight — was debated throughout the war. Loss rates above five percent per sortie were considered severe; rates above eight or ten percent were considered unsustainable. The Berlin campaign produced several raids with loss rates above five percent, and the final Nuremberg raid of March 30/31, 1944 — which occurred six days after the Alkemade incident — had a loss rate of approximately 11.9 percent, with 95 aircraft from 795 dispatched failing to return. That raid effectively ended Bomber Command’s deep-penetration campaign into central Germany until longer-range fighter escort became available later in 1944.
