The bail-out order would have been given immediately, either by Newman before he was incapacitated or by another surviving crew member communicating by intercom. The normal bail-out procedure for Lancaster crew members required each person to leave their station, retrieve and attach their parachute, and exit the aircraft through the nearest appropriate opening. For the tail gunner, this meant rotating the turret, stepping back into the fuselage, retrieving the parachute from its rack near the rear fuselage door, attaching it, and exiting.
The complication that defined Alkemade’s specific situation was that the fire had already reached the rear fuselage with sufficient intensity to make the parachute rack inaccessible. The accounts describe his parachute as burning — either already alight or in conditions where retrieving it would have required him to reach into the fire. The decision he describes — to exit without the parachute rather than burn — was therefore not taken in conditions of calm reflection but in conditions of fire, smoke, noise, the aircraft’s uncontrolled motion, and the knowledge that every second of delay was reducing his chances of surviving by any means.
The specific time between the attack and Alkemade’s exit from the aircraft cannot be precisely established. The aircraft’s loss of control altitude from operational height — approximately 18,000 feet or somewhat above — to the point at which Alkemade exited was probably rapid; an uncontrolled spiral in a Lancaster is not a gentle descent. The window in which bail-out was possible — above a survivable altitude for parachute deployment — was limited, and the fire narrowed that window further.
