Weather over Germany that day was poor. Thick cloud undercast covered the target area, with cloud tops at six to seven thousand feet. The plan was to bomb through the clouds using the lead ship’s radar. But near the initial point — the last navigation fix before the bomb run — the lead aircraft turned almost directly east instead of east-southeast toward Kassel. The error was later attributed to the radar operator. The formation, following the leader as trained, went with him, bombing Göttingen instead of Kassel — roughly fifty miles north of the intended target.
The error that might have been merely embarrassing became catastrophic because it separated the 445th from its fighter escort and from the rest of the bomber stream. After bombing Göttingen, the formation turned south and then west, finding itself approximately one hundred miles behind the rest of the division, alone over Germany.
The Luftwaffe found them. Around the turn southwest, one hundred to one hundred fifty German fighters attacked from the rear in three waves. Most were FW-190s, some with extra armor and heavy cannon armament. The attack lasted only a few minutes, as such engagements do.
Of the thirty-five aircraft that reached Germany, twenty-five went down over German territory. Of the two hundred thirty-eight men aboard those aircraft, one hundred fifteen were killed in action or died of their injuries. Including additional deaths in occupied France and Belgium, the total killed was at least one hundred seventeen. Only four aircraft returned to Tibenham.
Roger Freeman’s authoritative history *The Mighty Eighth* called the Kassel Mission the greatest single loss suffered by any Eighth Air Force group on any mission during the war. The 445th had been, in a few minutes over central Germany, effectively destroyed as a combat unit. It was rebuilt and returned to operations, but the September 27 mission remained the defining event of the group’s history.
