The North American P-51B Mustang, fitted with the Packard-built Rolls-Royce Merlin 61 engine, changed the equation. Its combination of speed, maneuverability, and — critically — range, made it capable of escorting bombers from England to Berlin and back. As P-51s arrived in the European theater in late 1943 and early 1944, the fighter escort began to extend all the way to the target.
The Big Week missions of February 1944 were among the first missions to have P-51 coverage throughout. Stewart flew on the first day of Big Week with the benefit of this extended escort — a different operational environment than the unescorted missions his group had flown in December 1943 and January 1944.
The significance is not that the P-51 made bombing missions safe. They were never safe. The significance is that the specific character of the threat changed: before the P-51, the bomber formations faced both flak and fighter attack during the unescorted portion of the mission; with the P-51, German fighters were increasingly met by American fighters before they could reach the bomber formations. The flak remained constant throughout; the fighter threat was mitigated, though not eliminated.
The transition also had strategic consequences that Stewart was part of. The P-51 escorts, by flying aggressively against German fighter coverage, progressively depleted the pool of experienced Luftwaffe fighter pilots in a way that the bomber formations alone could not do. Each B-24 shot down was ten men; each P-51 shot down was one. The asymmetry favored the Americans. The Luftwaffe’s experienced fighter pilot cadre was ground down through 1944 in ways that reduced its effectiveness against both the bomber campaign and, critically, against the invasion forces at Normandy in June 1944.
