The command pilot sat in the cockpit of the lead aircraft, alongside the aircraft commander (the actual pilot of that specific aircraft). The command pilot was responsible for the formation decisions; the aircraft commander was responsible for flying the aircraft. In practice, the distinction could blur in high-stress situations, but the design intent was clear: put the most experienced tactical officer in the most exposed position.

 

Stewart’s role in this system was to be that experienced officer. When he flew as deputy wing commander on the first day of Big Week, he was in the lead aircraft of the wing formation — the aircraft that the hundreds of bombers behind him were following. When he led the 2nd Bomb Wing against Berlin on March 22, he was in the aircraft that the entire wing was following over one of the most heavily defended targets in Germany.

 

The psychological demands of this role are worth considering. The command pilot in the lead aircraft could not evade. Formation doctrine required holding course from the initial point to the bomb release, regardless of what was happening around the aircraft. The flak was going off. The fighters were engaging. The aircraft in the formation behind and around the lead ship might be hit and fall away; the lead ship continued toward the target. The command pilot’s job was to continue.

 

This is not simply physical courage, though it required that. It required the ability to make decisions under acute stress while maintaining the focus and steadiness that the formation needed. A command pilot who showed visible agitation or uncertainty communicated that to the formation; a command pilot who maintained course and discipline communicated that too.

ADVERTISEMENT
Advertisement
Share.