The human cost of Big Week was substantial. The Eighth Air Force lost approximately 2,600 aircrew killed, wounded, or captured during the operation, along with hundreds of aircraft. German fighter production was disrupted but not permanently destroyed; the factories were dispersed and rebuilt more quickly than Allied planners anticipated. The long-term significance of Big Week was not so much the damage done to German production as the attrition it imposed on the Luftwaffe — particularly the loss of experienced pilots who could not be replaced as quickly as aircraft.
For Stewart, Big Week meant three combat missions in a single week, over some of the most heavily defended airspace in Europe, at a level of command where he was responsible not just for his own aircraft and crew but for the coordination of multiple groups.
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## Berlin, March 1944
On March 22, 1944, Stewart flew his twelfth credited combat mission. The target was Berlin.
Berlin in 1944 was perhaps the most heavily defended target the Eighth Air Force could attack. The German capital had concentrated antiaircraft defenses — the flak towers along the city’s periphery were massive reinforced concrete structures mounting heavy-caliber guns — and fighter coverage that included some of the Luftwaffe’s most experienced pilots. The city’s symbolic importance meant that its defenses were prioritized; losing Berlin to American bombers in daylight was something the German air defense system would fight hard to prevent.
Stewart led the 2nd Bomb Wing against Berlin on this mission. The formation he was leading included multiple groups, each with dozens of aircraft. The command role at that level — coordinating a wing-sized formation over Berlin — was a task requiring sustained decision-making under conditions that included antiaircraft fire, fighter attacks, navigation challenges, and the mechanical attrition that accumulated over long missions.
