## The Collapse of France: A Faster Defeat Than Anyone Expected
The speed of France’s defeat in May and June 1940 surprised everyone, including the German commanders who engineered it. The plan that produced it — known as Fall Gelb, Case Yellow — had been revised repeatedly in the winter of 1939-1940, and the version that was eventually executed was more audacious than anything previously attempted by a major army in modern warfare.
The original German plan for the western offensive resembled, with modifications, the Schlieffen Plan of the First World War: a strong right wing through Belgium driving toward the Channel and then pivoting south toward Paris, while the center and left held against French attacks. French and British commanders had anticipated something along these lines and had deployed their strongest forces in Belgium to meet it.
The revised plan, associated primarily with General Erich von Manstein, shifted the main German effort. Army Group B would attack into Belgium and the Netherlands with enough strength to draw the Allied mobile forces north. Army Group A would then drive through the Ardennes with the bulk of the German armored force, breaking through what the French considered to be impassable terrain and emerging onto the open plains of northern France far behind the Allied forces that had moved into Belgium.
The French Army’s assessment of the Ardennes as a barrier to armored advance was not unreasonable given the terrain’s characteristics and the experience of earlier campaigns. What it did not adequately account for was the pace at which the Germans intended to move and the degree to which the success of the plan depended on doing things that conventional military wisdom said were too risky to be viable.
