The overall pattern of German military dispositions in June and July 1943 shows forces spread across multiple theaters in ways that significantly reduced the concentration available to defend the actual Allied target. German and Italian defenders on Sicily numbered roughly 350,000, but the mobile armored forces and elite infantry that might have made the most difference were either on Sicily with reduced support or deployed elsewhere.
It is important to be precise about what can be claimed here. The German troop movements described above are documented. The connection to Mincemeat is supported by contemporary German signals decoded at Bletchley Park. What cannot be said with precision is exactly how many casualties would have resulted from a fully prepared Sicilian defense, or what specific battles would have been lost or won under different circumstances. The counterfactual cannot be established with the precision that popular accounts sometimes suggest.
What can be said is that Allied planners had feared a worst case of 10,000 casualties in the first week of the Sicily invasion. Actual Allied casualties in that first week were roughly one-seventh of that estimate. Allied naval planners had anticipated losing as many as 300 ships. Twelve were lost.
The Sicily campaign lasted thirty-eight days. Prewar estimates had set expectations closer to ninety days.
These gaps between expectation and outcome are consistent with an enemy that was less prepared, less concentrated, and less informed about the actual operation than it should have been.
K. SICILY AND THE LIMITS OF A FAMOUS SUCCESS STORY