Caverly stated his position carefully. He was not saying the defendants were not responsible for what they had done. He was not accepting the defense psychiatrists’ characterization of them as mentally ill in any clinically significant sense. He was saying that their age — nineteen and eighteen — was itself a reason to prefer a sentence of life imprisonment over death, because youth is an inherently incomplete condition, because a person who commits a crime at nineteen is not fully the person they will be at forty or fifty or sixty, and because a system of justice that cannot distinguish between the acts of an immature and not-yet-fully-developed human being and those of a mature adult is a less just system than one that makes that distinction.
This argument has since become more formally incorporated into American law than it was in 1924. The Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in *Roper v. Simmons*, which prohibited the death penalty for crimes committed by defendants under eighteen, drew explicitly on the developmental science that had accumulated over the intervening decades. The question of whether the execution of young people was compatible with the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment was answered, by a bare majority of the Court, in the negative — an answer that tracked closely, in its reasoning if not in its legal mechanism, with the argument Darrow had made in a Chicago courtroom eighty years earlier.
Leopold and Loeb were nineteen and eighteen, old enough that they would not have benefited from the *Roper* decision even had it existed. But the shape of the argument — that youth is a legally and morally relevant factor in capital sentencing, that a brain not yet fully developed is not a brain that can be held to the same standard of culpability as a fully mature one — is an argument that the Leopold and Loeb case helped put into the jurisprudential record.
