Both psychiatrists argued, in various ways, that the relationship between Leopold and Loeb had been particularly toxic: each had supplied something the other needed in a way that amplified their individual pathologies rather than moderating them. Loeb needed someone who would participate in his fantasies; Leopold needed someone whose approval was worth having. The result was a closed system in which neither checked the other’s escalating irrationality.
The prosecution’s psychiatric witness, William Krohn, rejected most of this analysis. Krohn argued that he had examined both defendants and found no evidence of mental disease as defined by the law or by clinical psychiatry. Both men had known what they were doing. Both had understood it was wrong. Both had planned it deliberately, executed it with care, and attempted to conceal it afterward. These were not the behaviors, Krohn argued, of men whose mental states were significantly impaired.
The debate between the defense and prosecution psychiatrists anticipated arguments about forensic psychiatry that would continue for decades. The question of what it means to understand an act is wrong, to have planned it deliberately, and yet to have done it anyway — in a mental state that clinical analysis could characterize as meaningfully abnormal — is a question that the law has never fully resolved.
What Judge Caverly’s decision did, implicitly, was to sidestep the psychiatric question by framing his decision around age rather than mental state. He did not need to decide whether Krohn or White was right about the defendants’ psychology in order to decide that nineteen and eighteen were young enough to warrant a sentence of life rather than death.
