He also made a specific argument about this specific case: that Leopold and Loeb were young, that youth was a condition defined by incompleteness, and that executing people for what they had done before they were fully formed was categorically different from executing people for what they had done as fully responsible adults. This was not a universal argument against the death penalty — it was an argument about these defendants, at this age, in this proceeding.
Caverly’s decision tracked this argument more closely than the psychiatric argument. He cited youth. He did not cite mental disease. He did not say that White’s or Glueck’s characterization of the defendants’ psychology was correct. He said that nineteen and eighteen were young enough that he would not impose death.
This distinction matters because it speaks to what actually changed in American law in the decades that followed. The specific holding in *Roper v. Simmons* (2005), prohibiting the death penalty for defendants who were under eighteen at the time of the offense, reflects a developmental argument about youth rather than a clinical argument about mental disease. It says, essentially, what Darrow said in 1924: youth is different, the juvenile brain is different, the moral accountability of a person who has not yet fully developed is different from that of a fully developed adult, and the law should reflect that difference.
Leopold and Loeb would not have benefited from *Roper*; they were nineteen and eighteen, over the threshold that *Roper* established. But the shape of the argument is the same, and the arc from Darrow’s summation to *Roper v. Simmons* is visible if you know where to look.
