The National Center for Missing and Exploited Children, established in 1984, was the keystone of this infrastructure. By 1994, it had a database of hundreds of thousands of missing children and had developed procedures for distributing information and coordinating with law enforcement. The Center maintained age-progression photographs, in which investigators used software to project what a missing child would look like at various ages beyond their disappearance. The Center’s hotline received tens of thousands of tips annually.

The specific way in which Bourdin exploited the Center’s infrastructure was through its openness to incoming information. The Center’s value lay partly in its willingness to receive tips and to share information with people who might have useful information about missing children. That openness was a deliberate design choice, reflecting the judgment that the costs of withholding information from potentially legitimate contacts outweighed the costs of occasionally providing information to people with bad intentions. Bourdin’s case represented a scenario that the Center’s designers had apparently not specifically anticipated: a person posing as a shelter official and using the Center’s processes to identify a specific missing child whose identity they intended to assume.

The case also illustrated something about the limitations of database-driven missing children investigation in the 1990s. The database could record Nicholas Barclay’s physical description and photograph. It could not biometrically verify that a person claiming to be Nicholas actually was Nicholas. The verification step required physical identification, either from a family member or from forensic comparison, and both of those verification mechanisms were vulnerable to manipulation in the specific way Bourdin manipulated them.

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