The plaintiff scientists’ position, in its strongest form, was that this discontinuity was important: that the connection between modern Native American tribes and an individual who lived 9,000 years ago was too uncertain to establish the kind of cultural affiliation that NAGPRA required. This was not, in the scientists’ framing, a denial that modern tribes had real and deep histories in the region. It was an argument about what NAGPRA required legally.
The tribal position, in its strongest form, was that oral tradition, cultural practice, and continuity of residence were evidence of a connection that scientific methods could not fully measure. The tribes did not need to prove, in a scientific sense, that every aspect of their culture was unchanged since 9,000 years ago. They needed to demonstrate that they were the living descendants of a tradition that went back to the people who lived and died along the Columbia River in the distant past.
Both positions are defensible at some level. The question is not which one is true in a philosophical sense, but which one the law requires — and what the law should require.
NAGPRA’s framers were trying to solve a specific, practical problem: federal agencies and research institutions held the remains of hundreds of thousands of Native Americans who had been removed from their burial places without consent. The goal of the law was to restore those remains to the communities that had the most legitimate claim on them. The law was not designed as a philosophical treatise on cultural continuity — it was designed to get people’s ancestors out of museum storage and back into the ground.
