The defense pointed to specific elements of that upbringing. Loeb had been raised in part by an intensely demanding governess who had controlled his environment tightly and isolated him from ordinary peer relationships. Leopold had experienced the death of his mother at a formative age; there were also accounts, later disclosed, of sexual abuse by a governess when he was twelve. These were offered not as excuses but as explanations — as evidence that the defendants were the products of forces that had shaped them before they were old enough to shape themselves.

The prosecution countered with its own psychiatric witness, Dr. William Krohn, who testified that he found no evidence of mental disease in either defendant. Krohn argued that both Leopold and Loeb understood the nature and quality of their acts, understood that those acts were wrong, and had acted with deliberation and forethought. He rejected the defense psychiatrists’ characterizations as tendentious and insufficiently grounded in clinical observation.

The question of what, exactly, the psychiatric testimony was supposed to prove in the context of a sentencing hearing — where the question was not guilt or innocence but rather life imprisonment versus death — was itself a complicated legal and logical problem. Darrow’s use of psychiatric evidence was not, technically, an insanity defense. It was something newer and less clearly defined: an argument that understanding the developmental and psychological factors that had produced a crime was relevant to determining the appropriate punishment for that crime.

This was not a standard argument in 1924. Darrow was making new law.

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