The case also sits at an interesting historical juncture in the development of forensic psychiatry. The extensive psychiatric testimony in the Leopold and Loeb proceedings — testimony that was not, in the end, directly dispositive of the sentence, since Caverly framed his decision primarily around age rather than mental illness — nonetheless established a precedent for the kind of psychological evidence that courts would increasingly be asked to consider in subsequent decades. The question of whether criminal behavior should be understood through a developmental and psychological lens, rather than purely through the lens of moral accountability, was not invented in the Leopold and Loeb courtroom. But it was argued there with unusual sophistication, in a case with unusual national visibility, at a moment when the legal system was just beginning to work out what to do with it.
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## The Nietzsche Problem
One element of the Leopold and Loeb case that attracted extensive commentary at the time, and that has continued to attract it since, was the role of philosophical ideas — specifically, Nathan Leopold’s adoption of Nietzschean philosophy as a framework for understanding himself and his relationship to ordinary moral rules.
Leopold had absorbed a particular reading of Nietzsche’s concept of the Übermensch. He understood it, or chose to understand it, as a license: the superior man was not bound by the moral conventions that governed ordinary people, because the superior man made his own moral law. Leopold believed he was such a man. He believed Loeb was such a man. He believed that their wealth, their intelligence, their education — all of the advantages they had been born into — confirmed their membership in the category of the exceptional.
