The antisemitism that surrounded the case’s public coverage added a further, uglier dimension to the community’s experience. The Ku Klux Klan, then at something close to its peak national membership and influence, used the case in its rhetoric about Jewish immigrants and Jewish wealth. The implication — that the crime was in some way representative of Jewish moral character, that the defendants’ religion was relevant to understanding their actions — was both vicious and logically incoherent, but it was present in the public atmosphere, and the members of Chicago’s German-Jewish community felt it.

The community’s response, in public at least, was to emphasize the normality of its institutions and the exceptional nature of the defendants — to insist, correctly, that Leopold and Loeb were not products of Jewish culture but rather aberrations from it, that the crime had nothing to do with the values that the community actually held. This was true. It was also defensive in a way that the circumstance required, and it did not entirely succeed in separating the case from the community that had produced its perpetrators.

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## The Significance of the Guilty Plea

Darrow’s decision to enter guilty pleas on behalf of Leopold and Loeb was, at the time, regarded as audacious — possibly reckless. It has since come to be understood as one of the most strategically astute decisions in the history of American criminal defense.

The standard strategy in a capital case of this magnitude, in 1924, was to plead not guilty and mount a defense. The obvious defense available was insanity, and the press had been anticipating it for weeks. The legal standard for insanity in Illinois at that time was the M’Naghten rule, which asked whether the defendant had known, at the time of the act, that what he was doing was wrong. If the defendant had that knowledge, he could not legally be found not guilty by reason of insanity.

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